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Abstract
We consider a therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the firms offer
horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of the brand-name drugs is a new treatment under patent
protection that will be introduced if the profits are sufficient to cover the entry costs. The other brand-name
drug has already lost its patent and faces competition from a third firm offering a generic version perceived to
be of lower quality. This model allows us to compare generic reference pricing (GRP), therapeutic reference
pricing (TRP), and no reference pricing (NRP). We show that competition is strongest under TRP, resulting
in the lowest drug prices (and medical expenditures). However, TRP also provides the lowest profits to the
patent-holding firm, making entry of the new drug treatment least likely. Surprisingly, we find that GRP
distorts drug choices most, exposing patients to higher health risks.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Pharmaceutical markets are characterised by price inelastic demand mainly due to extensive
medical insurance. Since individuals – once they are ill – only pay a small fraction of the medical
cost, prices are likely to have a limited effect, not only on the choice of whether or not to consume
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a drug, but also on the choice between alternative drug treatments. On the supply-side, there are
large, sunk R&D costs associated with discovery of new drug treatments. To stimulate innovation,
pharmaceutical firms are granted market power (for a given period) by patent protection.
The combination of supply-side market power and price inelastic demand has induced pur-
chasers to employ various means to control medical expenditures.1 We can distinguish between
two price control mechanisms: (i) regulation of drug prices (price caps); and (ii) regulation of
the reimbursement level, frequently referred to as reference pricing (RP). While price caps limit
pharmaceutical firms’ ability to exploit market power by charging high prices, RP aims at stim-
ulating competition by making demand more price elastic. In this paper, we analyse in detail the
effects of RP on the price-setting strategies of the pharmaceutical firms. On the basis of this anal-
ysis, we discuss implications for market entry of new drug treatments, patient health risks, and
optimal drug reimbursement policies. While these issues have received some empirical attention,
theoretical contributions are very limited.2
RP of prescription drugs is quite novel, but has rapidly become a widely used price control
mechanism in the pharmaceutical market. Germany’s Statutory Health Insurance System, gener-
ally viewed as the pioneer in this regard, introduced RP for prescription drugs in 1989, which was
followed in Europe by the Netherlands in 1991, Denmark and Sweden in 1993, Spain in 2000,
and Belgium and Italy in 2001. Norway adopted RP in 1993, but abandoned it in 2001, because
the expected cost savings did not materialise. Outside Europe, RP has been adopted by Australia,
the Canadian province of British Columbia, and New Zealand.3
The reference price is constructed as follows: drugs are classified into clusters based on similar
therapeutic effects. The regulator sets a reference price based on a relatively low-priced drug (e.g.,
the minimum or median price) in the cluster. The reference price is the maximum reimbursement
for all products in the group. Pharmaceutical firms can set prices above the RP, but in this case
the patient must pay the surcharge.4
The construction of therapeutic clusters for RP is by far the most controversial task in the
development of such systems. These clusters may be narrowly or broadly defined: (i) products
with the same active chemical ingredients, (ii) products with chemically related active ingredients
that are pharmacologically equivalent, and (iii) products that may be neither chemically identical
nor pharmacologically equivalent but have comparable therapeutic effects. By its nature, the first
type of cluster includes only off-patent brand-name drugs and their generic substitutes. The second
and third may include on-patent drugs. They differ in breadth, but are qualitatively similar. As
commonly done, we refer to the first type as generic reference pricing (GRP), and the second and
third as therapeutic reference pricing (TRP).
We construct a theoretical model that allows us to analyse the effects of the two RP systems,
as well as the benchmark case of no reference pricing (NRP), where patients pay a fixed share
1 Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview and discussion of various regulatory mechanisms in the pharmaceutical
industry.
2 According to the extensive literature survey by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2001), the bulk of the RP literature
is mainly descriptive, and there is a pronounced lack of theoretical studies analysing the effects of RP systems. See also
Danzon (2001).
3 In the US, RP has been proposed as a possible approach to drug reimbursement for a comprehensive Medicare drug
benefit (Huskamp et al., 2000). Kanavos and Reinhardt (2003) argue that RP for drugs is compatible with US health care.
Notably, generic reference pricing is well-established in the US through “maximum allowable charge” programs used by,
e.g., Medicaid.
4 On the other hand, if a firm’s price is below the RP, the savings may be shared between the payer and the dispensing
pharmacist.
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(given by a coinsurance rate) of the drug price.5 The basic set-up is a therapeutic market with
potentially three pharmaceutical firms, where two of the firms offer original brand-name drugs
with different chemical ingredients. One of the brand-name drugs is an old treatment (e.g., the
breakthrough drug) that has lost its patent protection and faces competition from a third firm
offering a generic version, perceived to be of lower quality than the off-patent brand-name drug.6
The other brand-name drug is a new, horizontally differentiated treatment under patent protection
that will be introduced in the market, if the profits are sufficient to cover the entry costs.7 This
modelling approach enables us to discuss the arguments for and against RP systems in general,
and between TRP and GRP in particular.
The main argument in favour of RP is that it stimulates price competition by making demand
more elastic, resulting in lower medical expenditures.8 Intuitively, the effect on price competition
should be stronger the wider the cluster is defined. Our model confirms this line of argument. We
show that the price of every drug in the therapeutic market is highest under NRP and lowest under
TRP.9 It is worth noting that GRP not only reduces prices of the drugs in the reference cluster, but
also puts a downward pressure on the price of the non-included, but therapeutically equivalent,
drug.10 This is due to prices being strategic complements.
The inclusion of on-patent drugs is perhaps the main source of controversy over RP-systems.
It is argued that TRP per se effectively eliminates patent protection and will stifle innovation in
drug therapy, while GRP, on the other hand, is considered to have a minimal effect on incentives
for R&D since it applies only to off-patent drugs (see e.g., Danzon, 2001; Lopez-Casasnovas and
Puig-Junoy, 2000). Our model confirms the first line of the argument, but not the second. We
show that TRP provides the lowest profits to the patent-holding firm, making market entry (and
innovation) of the new drug treatment least likely.11 However, we also find that a patent-holding
firm can be negatively affected by RP, even if on-patent drugs are exempted from this particular
reimbursement system. Stronger price competition induced by GRP forces the patent-holding
firm to lower the price of its drug in order to reduce the loss of market shares.
Another important concern about TRP is that this system forces a large number of patients to opt
for a less suitable drug simply to avoid the extra copayment. The broader the therapeutic cluster, the
5 The NRP regime is often referred to as “free pricing”, but we find this somewhat imprecise, since RP in itself does
not restrict price-setting of drugs by pharmaceutical firms. Only the reimbursement level is regulated, not drug prices.
6 Empirical evidence strongly suggests that generic drugs are not perceived to be perfect substitutes to the original
brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical. After generic entry, the original brand-name firm typically charges
a higher price than its generic version and still has positive market shares (e.g., Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Frank
and Salkever, 1997; Scott Morton, 2000). These findings fit well with predictions of vertical differentiation models. Two
recent papers applied to branded-generic competition are Cabrales (2003) and Ko¨nigbauer (2006).
7 One can think of the entry costs as a marketing cost associated with entering a new country-specific market. Alter-
natively, the entry costs can be thought of as (expected) R&D costs, which must be recouped for the discovery of a new
drug treatment to take place.
8 To be precise, demand becomes more elastic above the reference price. Unless the reference price is set equal to the
lowest priced drug in the cluster, the price elasticity of demand remains unchanged below the reference price.
9 Pavcnik (2002) provides strong evidence from Germany that the introduction of RP has induced pharmaceutical prices
to drop, the effect being stronger for branded drugs facing generic competition. Aronsson et al. (2001) and Bergman and
Rudholm (2003) provide similar evidence from Sweden.
10 A recent paper by Brekke et al. (2006b) provides empirical evidence on a cross-price effect of (generic) RP on
non-included therapeutic substitutes.
11 This result has empirical support from Danzon and Ketcham (2004) who analyse the effect of RP on the availability
of drugs in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
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more severe is the trade-off between surcharges and increased health risks to patients.12 GRP, on
the other hand, is said to conserve third party funds without exposing patients to significant risks,
because it applies to substitution only among generically equivalent drugs that have demonstrated
bioequivalence to the original brand-name drug. For given prices, this is, of course, trivially true.
However, the intention of the RP systems is to induce price responses from the pharmaceutical
firms. Taking this into account, we show that, in fact, GRP distorts drug choices most, exposing
patients to higher health risks. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from reference pricing under
GRP, the patent-holding firm faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors, and can thus
charge a considerably higher price. This induces a larger fraction of patients to choose the drugs
that are included in the reference cluster, which are less suitable, but has a lower copayment.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest no clear-cut conclusions about the optimal
choice of reimbursement system. We can, however, make distinctions among the following general
cases. If the costs of launching a new drug in a specific country are low, with a corresponding low
risk of no market entry for new drugs, then TRP is clearly socially favourable.13,14 However, if this
is not the case, then either NRP or GRP might be necessary to stimulate market entry. The choice
between NRP and GRP implies a trade-off, since the former yields higher drug expenditures but
lower health risks to patients. A social planner’s evaluation of this particular trade-off is determined
by the importance of drug expenditures in the planner’s objective function. GRP might thus be the
favoured reimbursement system in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is insignificant
or non-existent, while NRP might be preferred otherwise.
The theoretical literature on RP is, as mentioned above, very limited, with only a couple of
notable exceptions. Zweifel and Crivelly (1996) analyse the pricing responses to the introduction
of a RP system using a Bertrand duopoly model. They frame their analysis in the context of the
introduction of the TRP system in Germany in 1989. Danzon and Lui (1996) use a monopolistic
competition model with kinked demand and imperfect physician agency to predict price responses
to RP. The modelling approaches are distinctly different from ours. The combination of horizontal
and vertical differentiation allows us to analyse and compare GRP and TRP closely. Moreover,
our model also enables the analysis of market entry and health risks to patients, which are lacking
in the above mentioned studies.15
Our paper contributes also to the more general literature on horizontal and vertical product
differentiation. Most papers within this field allow firms to invest in quality, but assume consumers
12 Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000, p. 111)formulate this problem as follows:
“First, if there is no interchangeability at the level of the individual patient [. . . ] then the copayment may become
not avoidable and the RP system may discriminate against some patients. Second, selection of a drug under a RP
category may result in a lower level of effectiveness and potentially harmful side effects for the patient because
the drug is chosen simply with a view to avoiding the copayment”.
The same argument is presented by Danzon (2001).
13 Country-specific launching costs include typically marketing activities like providing information about the drug to
the government in order to obtain sales approval and, potentially, listing in the reimbursement plan, promotion of the drug
to physicians (detailing), etc.
14 In a broader perspective, the introduction of TRP may influence the global launch decision. If large (and rich) countries
– like the US and the UK – implement TRP, this may have a significant effect on the global returns on a new drug, which in
turn may induce lower R&D investments. On the other hand, it has been argued that TRP induces more R&D investments
in drastic relative to “me-too” innovations. The net effect of TRP on global welfare is thus not clear-cut, and definitely
outside the scope of the current paper.
15 These important aspects of RP-systems are also absent in Merino-Castello´ (2003), who studies the price effects of
generic reference pricing in a vertical differentiation model.
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to differ only in terms of the horizontal space (taste).16 The present paper explicitly combines the
horizontal differentiation framework of Hotelling (1929) with the vertical differentiation frame-
work introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
While these two approaches typically are applied separately, the pharmaceutical market – with
both inter-brand (branded versus branded) and intra-brand (branded versus generic) competition
– serves as a natural example for combining these frameworks.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the model is presented. In Section 3, the
equilibrium prices are derived and characterised for all three regimes. Section 4 analyses the
market entry decision of the firm with the new drug treatment. Section 5 analyses the welfare
properties of the three different regimes, and presents some policy implications. In Section 6, we
extend our model to the special case of no coinsurance. Finally, Section 7 provides a discussion
and some concluding remarks.
2. The model
Consider a particular therapeutic market for prescription drugs with the following character-
istics. There are two patient types, indexed by j = H,L, differing with respect to their gross
valuation of drug treatment, due to, e.g., different degrees of illness. A fraction λ of the patients
are H-types, with a gross valuation v; the remaining patients – the L-types – have a gross val-
uation γv, where γ ∈ (0, 1). Both patient types are uniformly distributed on the line segment
S = [0, 1], with a total mass of 1, where the location of an arbitrary patient, x ∈ S, is associ-
ated with the patient’s susceptibility towards specific drug characteristics. A “mismatch cost”
parameter t measures the utility loss per unit of distance between a patent’s ideal treatment –
given by his location on S – and the drug actually consumed. We can think of such mismatch
costs as reflecting various side-effects or contraindications that reduce the gross valuation of drug
treatment.
There are potentially three pharmaceutical single-product firms, indexed by i = 0, 1,G, operat-
ing in the market. Firms 0 and 1 offer original brand-name drugs at prices p0 and p1, respectively.
These drugs, which differ with respect to chemical compounds, are located at either end of
the unit interval S, reflecting their horizontally differentiated treatment effects. We assume that
drug 1 is a new treatment version – still under patent protection – that will be introduced in
this particular market, if variable profits are sufficient to cover entry costs. Drug 0, on the
other hand, has already lost its patent protection and faces generic competition from a third
pharmaceutical firm G, offering a generic drug version at a price pG. In terms of horizontal
differentiation, the generic drug is (naturally) also positioned at 0. However, in the eyes of
the patients, 0 and G are vertically differentiated. This is captured by assuming that patients’
gross valuation of the generic drug is deflated by a factor θ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the perceived qual-
ity difference between the two versions of drug treatment 0 is given by (1 − θ). This vertical
differentiation might be due to differences in advertising intensity that creates perceived quality
differences, or simply that the brand-name drug is perceived to be safer due to a longer life in the
market.
16 Several papers have added quality competition to a standard Hotelling-framework, see e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993)
for the case of fixed locations under both price competition and price regulation, Economides (1989) for the case of
endogenous locations and price competition, and Brekke et al. (2006a) for the case of endogenous locations and price
regulation. However, none of these papers allow consumers to differ with respect to their willingness-to-pay for quality,
which means that the vertical differentiation framework is not explicitly dealt with.
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Each patient needs one unit of either drug version. A patient of type j who is located at x and
consumes a unit of drug i obtains utility
Uj(x, i) =
{
uj − t|x − i| − ci if i = 0, 1
θuj − tx − ci if i = G
, (1)
where
uj =
{
v if j = H
γv if j = L , (2)
and ci is the patient copayment for drug i. In absence of a reference price system, the patient
copayment for drug i is given by ci = αpi + f , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the coinsurance rate and f
is the deductible (or a flat fee).17 Since patients pay the same deductible irrespective of which
drug they decide to buy, f does not affect drug choices and can therefore be normalised to zero,
without any loss of generality. On the other hand, in the presence of a reference price system, the
copayment is based on a reference price p¯, and the patients must additionally pay the full price
difference if choosing a drug in the reference group which is priced in excess of the reference
price. Thus, if drug i is included in a reference price system, the copayment is given by
ci =
{
αpi if pi ≤ p¯
αp¯ + (pi − p¯) if pi > p¯
. (3)
We analyse a three-stage game with the following sequence of events:
1. A benevolent regulator decides on the socially optimal drug reimbursement policy to imple-
ment. She chooses among the following policies: (i) no reference pricing, (ii) therapeutic
reference pricing, or (iii) generic reference pricing.
2. Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market and thus to offer a new treatment, given that
treatment 0 already exists and is offered in the form of both an original version (drug 0) and a
generic substitute (drug G).
3. All pharmaceutical firms in the market play a simultaneous pricing game.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction.
3. Drug pricing
In this section we derive the optimal pricing strategies of the pharmaceutical firms for each
of the three possible reimbursement regimes. We look for an equilibrium where all firms are
active and compete in terms of prices. This requires some restrictions on the parameters. More
specifically, we assume that the mismatch cost parameter t is bounded from both below and
above, i.e., t ∈ (t, ¯t), where the lower and upper bounds are functions of the other parameters.
In the appendix we show that, when t ∈ (t, ¯t), there exists a vertically separating equilibrium,
17 This copayment system is the most common one (see e.g., Kanavos, 2001). However, some countries (e.g., the
Netherlands) do not have any coinsurance element in the patient copayment. In the US, tiered formularies are typically
used instead of coinsurance, except for the new Medicare prescription drug plan, which may include coinsurance. In
Section 6 we extend the model to capture also the special case of no coinsurance (i.e., α = 0), while Section 7 includes a
brief discussion of tiered formularies.
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where the brand-name drug 0 is priced ‘high’ and consumed by the H-types only, while the
generic substitute G is priced ‘low’ and consumed by the L-types only.18 On the other hand, the
horizontally differentiated brand-name drug 1 is consumed by both types in equilibrium. This is
the only possible type of equilibrium where the generic drug can survive in the market, since all
patients prefer drug 0 over drug G if c0 = cG, implying that either all or no patients of type j
prefer 0 over G if c0 = cG.
It is worth noting that, in this context, it makes considerable intuitive sense to focus on inter-
mediate values of the mismatch cost parameter t. On the one hand, a very low t is not compatible
with patent protection, since a new drug must be sufficiently differentiated to obtain a patent.
On the other hand, a very high t is not compatible with the notion of a ‘therapeutic market’. In
particular, the idea of therapeutic reference pricing requires that the drugs included in a reference
group are not too differentiated.
3.1. Demand and proﬁts
Let us first derive drug demand for each firm, under the assumption of vertical market segmen-
tation. This requires the identification of two indifferent patients; one for each of the two patient
types.
The H-types choose between the two brand-name drugs, and the location of the indifferent
H-type patient, denoted x˜H, is given by the solution to
UH(x˜H, 0) = UH(x˜H, 1),
yielding
x˜H = 12 +
c1 − c0
2t
. (4)
The L-types, on the other hand, choose between the generic drug G and the horizontally
differentiated brand-name drug 1. The location of the indifferent L-type patient, denoted x˜L, is
given by the solution to
UL(x˜L,G) = UL(x˜L, 1),
yielding
x˜L = 12 +
c1 − cG − γv(1 − θ)
2t
. (5)
Under the additional assumption of full market coverage, so that all patients obtain non-negative
utility from the consumption of their most preferred drug, the demand facing firm i is given by19
Di =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λx˜H if i = 0
λ(1 − x˜H) + (1 − λ)(1 − x˜L) if i = 1
(1 − λ)x˜L if i = G
. (6)
18 To be more precise, we show that an equilibrium exists when t ∈ (t, ¯tk), k = NRP, TRP, GRP. In other words, there
is a common lower bound on t in all three regimes, whereas the upper bound generally differs between the regimes.
19 Fig. 1 illustrates the demand system.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the demand system.
Finally, assuming zero production costs, (variable) profits for firm i are simply given by20
πi = piDi. (7)
3.2. No reference pricing
In the absence of any reference price system, the patient copayment for drug consumption is
simply given by
cNRPi = αpNRPi . (8)
Explicit expressions for the profit functions under the NRP-system are easily found by using
(8) in (4)–(7). In equilibrium, the two-brand name producers choose prices pNRP0 and pNRP1 that
maximise π0 and π1, respectively, as defined by (7). The optimal strategy for the generic producer,
on the other hand, is to choose a price pNRPG that is just low enough to make it unprofitable for firm
0 to deviate from pNRP0 by setting a ‘low’ price that also captures the L-types. The equilibrium
drug prices are given by21
pNRP0 =
3t
α
Δ0, (9)
pNRP1 =
t
α
Δ1, (10)
pNRPG =
1
α
[3tΔG − γv(1 − θ)], (11)
20 At this stage, market entry costs (R&D costs and/or marketing costs) are sunk and thus play no role for the analysis.
21 A full derivation of the equilibrium is given in the appendix.
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where
Δ0 := 3 − (1 − λ)
√
1 − λ
8 + λ(λ2 + 3(1 − λ)) > 0, (12)
Δ1 := 10 − λ(λ
2 + 3(1 − λ)) − 6(1 − λ)√1 − λ
8 + λ(λ2 + 3(1 − λ)) > 0, (13)
ΔG := 4 − λ(2 − λ) − (4 − λ)
√
1 − λ
8 + λ(λ2 + 3(1 − λ)) > 0. (14)
We see that all prices are increasing in t and decreasing in α. Higher mismatch costs reduce
the substitutability, and thus the degree of competition, between the brand-name drugs, leading to
higher prices. A higher coinsurance rate, on the other hand, increases the price elasticity of drug
demand, leading to lower prices in equilibrium. It is also straightforward to show that ∂Δi/∂λ > 0,
implying ∂pi/∂λ > 0, for all i = 0, 1,G. A higher fraction of H-types implies an increase in the
overall willingness to pay, with a corresponding price increase, for the original drugs. This price
increase also enables the generic producer to charge a higher price in equilibrium.22 Note also
that a reduction of the perceived quality difference between the two versions of treatment 0 (i.e.,
an increase in θ) leads to a higher price for the generic drug version, as expected.
On the other hand, a higher gross valuation of drug treatment for the L-types – i.e., an increase
in γ– leads to a lower generic price in equilibrium. The reason is that a higher gross valuation for
the L-types, implying a higher willingness-to-pay for drugs, makes it more profitable for firm 0
to lower its price in order to capture the L-segment of the market. Consequently, the generic firm
must reduce its price in order to prevent this price-undercutting strategy from the brand-name
firm. If the difference in gross valuations between the two patient types becomes sufficiently
small – i.e., if γ becomes sufficiently close to 1 – it is not possible for the generic firm, with a
(perceived) lower-quality product, to prevent that the brand-name firm serves both patient types
in equilibrium. In this case, the generic drug is driven out of the market.
From (9)–(11) we can easily establish the following ranking of equilibrium drug prices:
pNRP0 > p
NRP
1 > p
NRP
G . (15)
These price differences are reflected in the allocation of equilibrium market shares:
x˜NRPH =
3[3 − (1 − λ)√1 − λ]
2[8 + λ(λ2 + 3(1 − λ))] ∈
(
3
8
,
1
2
)
, (16)
x˜NRPL =
3[2 + (2 − λ)λ + (2 + λ)√1 − λ]
2[8 + λ(λ2 + 3(1 − λ))] ∈
(
1
2
, 0.77
)
. (17)
Proposition 1. Under NRP, the brand-name drug with a generic substitute always charges the
highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are distorted; H-type patients consume more of
the new, patent-protected, brand-name drug, while L-type patients consume more of the generic
drug.
It might seem counterintuitive that the price level is higher for the brand-name drug with a
generic substitute, since, normally, we would expect prices to be lower for products that face
22 From (11) and (14) we see that λ must be sufficiently high to secure a non-negative generic drug price, and thus
equilibrium existence. See the appendix for exact conditions.
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stronger competition. The reason for this result is that, due to generic competition, the optimal
strategy of firm 0 is to concentrate exclusively on serving the H-type patients and leave the L-
types to the generic competitor. Since firm 0 competes only for H-patients, with less price-elastic
demand, while firm 1 competes for both patient types, firm 0 sets a higher price than firm 1 in
equilibrium.23 This theoretical result is reminiscent of several empirical findings of price increases
for brand-name drugs after the entry of generic substitutes in the market.24,25
Inserting the equilibrium prices into (7), we derive equilibrium profits:
πNRP0 =
3tλΔ0
2α
(1 + Δ1 − 3Δ0), (18)
πNRP1 =
tΔ1
2α
(1 + 3(ΔG(1 − λ) + λΔ0) − Δ1), (19)
πNRPG =
(1 − λ)
2α
(1 + Δ1 − 3ΔG)(3tΔG − γv(1 − θ)). (20)
3.3. Reference pricing
Consider now the implementation of a reference pricing system. This implies that some drugs
are aggregated into a cluster and are subject to the same reference price p¯. The introduction of a
reference pricing system involves the following decision-making.
First, the regulator must decide which drugs to include in a cluster, or reference group. In our
model, this choice boils down to whether or not the new brand-name drug should be included.
Inclusion of the horizontally differentiated new drug implies therapeutic reference pricing. On
the other hand, if the reference group consists only of the old brand-name drug and its generic
substitute, the reimbursement system is characterised as generic reference pricing.
Second, the regulator must decide on the reference price level. In most countries, this level
is set at, or close to, the lowest drug price in the cluster. In the present analysis, we follow this
practice by assuming that the lowest price in the reference group – i.e., the generic price – is
chosen as the reference price level: p¯ = pG.
3.3.1. Therapeutic reference pricing
Under TRP, the reference group consists of all three drugs in the therapeutic market, also
the horizontally differentiated drug 1. By the assumption of p¯ = pG, the copayments faced by
patients under TRP are given by
cTRPi =
{
pTRPi − (1 − α)pTRPG if i = 0, 1
αpTRPG if i = G
. (21)
23 Obviously, this result depends also on our assumption that the new horizontally differentiated product is not of higher
quality than the old off-patent product.
24 The empirical study by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) shows that generic entry was followed by price increases by the
branded producer, a result later confirmed by Frank and Salkever (1997). This finding was called the “generic competition
paradox” by Scherer (1993).
25 In our model, it does not necessarily follow that generic entry leads to a higher price for the off-patent drug. Under
the assumption of full market coverage in both patient segments, it is easily shown that equilibrium prices in the duopoly
case, without generic competition, is given by p0 = p1 = t/α, implying that generic entry leads to lower prices, although
the price reduction is smallest for the off-patent drug 0. However, generic entry might lead to increased prices for the
off-patent drug, if the L-segment is not fully covered in the duopoly equilibrium.
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The copayments differ as compared to NRP, since the patients that are prescribed one of the
original drugs are now also fully liable for the price difference with respect to the reference price.
As before, explicit expressions for the profit functions under the NRP-system are found by
using (21) in (4)–(7), and the derivation of the equilibrium is similar to that under the NRP-system.
We find equilibrium prices under TRP to be given by
pTRPi = αpNRPi , i = 0, 1,G. (22)
Thus, compared with NRP, TRP implies that prices are set as if α = 1. The reason is that, with
TRP, the patients are fully liable for any price increase above the reference level. This also implies
that equilibrium prices are independent of the coinsurance rate α. Furthermore, since equilibrium
market shares are independent of α, both patient types are equally distorted under the two regimes.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, relative price differences and market shares are equal under NRP
and TRP.
Compared with the NRP-case, the (uniform) downward pressure on drug prices under TRP is
also reflected in lower equilibrium profits, now given by
πTRPi = απNRPi , i = 0, 1,G. (23)
3.3.2. Generic reference pricing
Under GRP, only generic substitutes are grouped into the same cluster as the original, off-patent
drugs. Horizontally differentiated, but therapeutically equivalent, drug versions are not included.
In our model, copayments faced by consumers under GRP are thus given by
cGRPi =
{
pGRPi − (1 − α)pGRPG if i = 0
αpGRPi if i = 1,G
. (24)
While only a fraction α of the drug price needs to be paid on drugs G and 1, patients that are
prescribed the brand-name drug 0 must additionally pay the full price difference between the
original drug and the generic substitute.
Equilibrium prices, derived in the same way as previously, are given by
pGRP0 =
(
2 + α − (√1 − λ) (2 − λ − α))Γ
˜Δ
, (25)
pGRP1 =
t ¯Δ + (1 − α)(1 − θ)γv( ˆΔ − 2(2 + α)) − (√1 − λ) (2α − λ(α + 1))Γ
α ˜Δ
, (26)
pGRPG =
3t(αλ − 3λ + λ2 + 4) − γv(1 − θ) ˆΔ − (4 − λ)Γ√(1 − λ)
˜Δ
, (27)
where
ˆΔ := 4α + 5λ − 2αλ − 4λ2 + λ3 + αλ2 + 4 > 0, (28)
˜Δ := 8α + 8λ − 6αλ − 5λ2 + λ3 + 2αλ2 + α2λ > 0, (29)
¯Δ := 10α + λ − 6αλ + 2λ2 − λ3 + αλ2 + 2α2λ > 0, (30)
Γ := 3t − γv(1 − θ)(1 − α) > 0. (31)
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Using the equilibrium prices derived above, we can find the equilibrium market shares under
GRP, characterised by the location of the indifferent patient in each patient-group:
x˜GRPH =
Γ
[(2 + α) − (2 − λ − α)√1 − λ]
2t ˜Δ
, (32)
x˜GRPL =
Γ
[
α(2 − λ) + λ(3 − λ) + (2α + λ)√1 − λ]
2t ˜Δ
. (33)
Comparing with (16) and (17), it is also relatively straightforward to verify that
x˜GRPj > x˜
TRP
j = x˜NRPj , j = H,L, (34)
implying that more patients choose one of the drugs included in the reference cluster under
GRP—drug 0 and G.
In order to evaluate the ranking of equilibrium prices under GRP, we now make a rather weak
assumption on the coinsurance rate, namely thatα < (2/3). We are then able to make the following
characterisation of the pricing equilibrium under generic reference pricing26:
Proposition 3. Assume that α < (2/3). Then, under GRP, the brand-name ﬁrm without a generic
substitute always charges the highest price in equilibrium. Both patient groups are generally
distorted; the L-types always consume more of the generic drug, while the H-types consume more
of the new patent-protected brand-name drug, if λ and/or t are sufﬁciently low, and more of the
old off-patent product otherwise.
A proof is given in Appendix D.
We see that the ranking of equilibrium prices changes under a generic reference price system;
the price is now higher for the brand-name drug without a generic substitute. The reason is
simply that drug 1 is not included in the reference cluster. If a consumer chooses this drug, her
copayment is given by a share α on the total drug price. In contrast, if she chooses the off-patent
drug 0, which is included in the reference cluster, she must pay the full price difference between
the generic substitute and the brand-name drug. Thus, by not having its product included in the
reference group, firm 1 faces a less elastic demand and will consequently charge a higher price
in equilibrium.
In contrast to the NRP or TRP systems, equilibrium price differences do not automatically
translate into equivalent differences in equilibrium market shares. The reason is the asymmetry
introduced by different copayments for patients, depending on whether or not the demanded drug
is subject to reference pricing. Consequently, even if firm 1 sets the highest drug price, it may not
be the most expensive alternative for consumers, and consequently, this firm may have a higher
market share in the H-segment. From Proposition 3 we see that this is will be the case if λ and/or t
are sufficiently low. In this case, the price of the on-patent drug is kept relatively low by incentives
to capture a larger share of the L-segment (which is more important the lower the level of λ) and/or
fierce competition due to a relatively low degree of horizontal differentiation.
On the other hand, the location of the indifferent L-type patient is always distorted towards
drug 1, as before. In other words, due to the price difference between generic and brand-name
drugs, a larger share of L-patients consume the generic drug G. Finally, it should be noted that,
26 We have tried, with no success, to find numerical examples where the ranking of equilibrium prices change for
α > (2/3) (keeping in mind that equilibrium prices must satisfy the condition t ∈ (t, ¯t)). Thus, we believe that the results
apply for all α ∈ (0, 1). Unfortunately, we are not able to prove this analytically.
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even though the H-segment may be distorted ‘both ways’ under GRP, the L-segment is always
more distorted towards drug 1. This can easily be verified from (32) and (33) by confirming that
x˜GRPL > x˜
GRP
H .
Using the equilibrium prices reported in (25)–(27), we can derive equilibrium profits under
GRP. These profit expressions are rather detailed, and are therefore relegated to the appendix.
3.4. Price comparison
As a next step, in order to evaluate how the reimbursement system affects drug prices, let us
compare equilibrium price levels for the same drugs across different regimes. Using the equi-
librium prices reported for the different cases above, it is relatively straightforward to verify
that
pNRPi > p
GRP
i > p
TRP
i , i = 0, 1,G, (35)
for all t > t. In other words:
Proposition 4. The price of every drug in the therapeutic market is highest under NRP and
lowest under TRP.
This result reflects and confirms the main rationale behind reference pricing. By introducing a
reference pricing system, price competition is generally increased since the price elasticity of drug
demand increases for prices above the reference price level. Furthermore, this effect is stronger
if more drugs are included in the reference cluster, implying that drug prices are lower under
TRP than under GRP. Since prices are strategic complements, the introduction of a reference
price system of either kind puts a downward pressure on the prices of all drugs in the market.
Compared with the NRP case, the introduction of generic reference pricing has a direct negative
effect on the price level of drug 0, which, in turn, leads to a reduction also in the price of drug 1,
even though this drug is not included in the reference cluster under GRP. Furthermore, by going
from GRP to TRP, firm 1 gets a direct incentive to cut its drug prices, which then indirectly leads
to a further price reduction also for drug 0. Finally, lower prices for brand-name drugs imply that
the generic producer must also lower its price in order to stay in the market.
4. Market entry
Let us now turn to the question of market entry. When interpreting the market in question
as country-speciﬁc therapeutic market, demarcated by national regulation, we can realistically
assume that firm 1 will enter this particular market (i.e., offer its newly developed product in this
country) only if expected profits from sales in this market cover the market entry costs. When
considering the costs and benefits of entry, the firm must take into account how the reimbursement
policy in a given country is likely to affect profits from drug sales in this country.
In our model, there is a clear-cut ranking of equilibrium profits for the potential entrant (firm
1) across the different reimbursement regimes:
Proposition 5. Equilibrium proﬁts of the patent-holding entrant are always highest under NRP
and lowest under TRP.
A proof is given in Appendix D.
The profit comparison between NRP and TRP is straightforward. Compared with the case of
no reference pricing, the TRP system puts a downward pressure on drug prices, while keeping
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equilibrium market shares intact, implying that profits are unambiguously lower in the TRP
equilibrium. NRP also outperforms GRP, from the viewpoint of firm 1, since prices and market
shares are higher in the former case. A comparison between GRP and TRP, on the other hand,
shows that prices are higher, but market shares lower, in the former case. Nevertheless, equilibrium
profits are always higher under generic reference pricing. The reason is that, under GRP, firm 1
faces drug demand with a lower price elasticity, which enables this firm to charge a considerably
higher price while suffering a moderate loss of market shares. All else equal, it follows that
expected profits for a potential entrant are always lowest when entering a market that is subject
to therapeutic reference pricing, and highest when entering a market with no reference pricing.
This result is not surprising, and tallies well with the popular concern about therapeutic refer-
ence pricing with respect to a potential erosion of patent rights, as discussed in the Introduction.
However, it is worth noting that a patent-holding firm can be negatively affected by reference
pricing even if on-patent drugs are exempted from this particular reimbursement system. In our
model, firm 1’s profits are lower under GRP, compared with no reference pricing, even if drug 1
is not included in the reference cluster. The reason is that firm 1 offers a drug that is an imperfect
substitute to the drugs directly affected by the GRP system. Stronger price competition between
firms 0 and G – induced by generic reference pricing – implies that firm 1 is also forced to lower
the price of its on-patent drug in order to reduce the loss of market shares.
5. Welfare
In this section, we analyse and discuss the effects of different RP systems on social welfare. We
will consider two different welfare perspectives: a global welfare perspective where social welfare
is given by the sum of consumer and producer surplus net of third-party payment for drugs, and
a public payer perspective where pharmaceutical profits do not enter the welfare function. In the
first part of the section, we make the assumption that expected profits for firm 1 are always high
enough to secure entry of the new drug. Subsequently, in the latter part of the section, we discuss
policy implications when entry is uncertain. Throughout the welfare analysis, we also make the
following two assumptions: First, we assume that the regulator does not take into account the
“artificial” vertical differentiation between the branded and generic drugs. In other words, the
regulator attaches the same gross utility to objectively homogenous products. We think this is
a reasonable (though not trivial) assumption. Second, we assume, for simplicity, that the public
payer is able to raise the necessary funds for drug payment in a non-distortionary manner.
5.1. Global welfare
If the welfare function is defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, net of third-party
payment for drugs, social welfare under reimbursement system k is given by
Wk = ¯U − Ck, (36)
where ¯U denotes patients’ gross utility of drug consumption 27, while Ck denotes total mismatch
costs under reimbursement system k. Thus, maximising welfare amounts to minimising total
27 When the perceived vertical differentiation is not taken into account, patients’ gross utility of drug consumption is
given by ¯U := v(λ + (1 − λ)γ).
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mismatch costs, which are given by
Ck = λ
(∫ x˜kH
0
(st) ds +
∫ 1
x˜kH
((1 − s)t) ds
)
+ (1 − λ)
(∫ x˜kL
0
(st) ds +
∫ 1
x˜kL
((1 − s)t) ds
)
.
(37)
Clearly, total mismatch costs are minimised if x˜kL = x˜kH = (1/2). In other words, mismatch
costs are minimised if all patients located at x ≤ (1/2) are prescribed either drug 0 or G, while
all patients located at x > (1/2) are prescribed drug 1. However, due to price differences, total
mismatch costs will never be minimised in equilibrium. We have previously shown that x˜ = (1/2)
for at least one patient type in all three reimbursement regimes. We also know that equilibrium
market shares are equal under NRP and TRP, implying that total mismatch costs must also be
equal under these two regimes.
The explicit expression for total mismatch costs in each of the three different regimes, which
are quite detailed, are given in the appendix. Based on these expressions, we are able to derive the
following unambiguous ranking of reimbursement systems with respect to equilibrium mismatch
costs:
CGRP > CTRP = CNRP. (38)
This constitutes the main result of our welfare analysis28:
Proposition 6. NRP and TRP yield equal mismatch costs in equilibrium, and these are always
lower than under GRP.
It follows that, if a regulator seeks to maximise global welfare, generic reference pricing should
never be implemented; mismatch costs would be lower in equilibrium by choosing either NRP or
TRP. In order to explain this result, let us first consider the distortive effects of GRP on each of the
two patient types. We know that x˜GRPL > x˜TRPL = x˜NRPL > (1/2), due to the larger price difference
between the generic drug and the horizontally (and vertically) differentiated drug 1 under GRP.29
This implies that GRP always increases total mismatch costs in the L-segment. For H-types, on
the other hand, we know that x˜TRPH = x˜NRPH < (1/2) and x˜GRPH > x˜TRPH = x˜NRPH . However, since
x˜GRPH ≶ (1/2), it is possible that GRP reduces aggregate mismatch costs for the H-types if x˜GRPH
is sufficiently close to the midpoint of the line segment S. Nevertheless, a possible reduction in
mismatch costs for H-types will always be more than outweighed by the increase in mismatch
costs for L-types. The reason is two-fold. First, mismatch costs are reduced for H-types only if
λ – the fraction of H-types in the population – is sufficiently low (cf. Proposition 3), in which
case the contribution of H-types to total mismatch costs is also relatively low. Second, since the
location of the indifferent L-type is further away from the midpoint of S in all regimes, the effect
of a marginal relocation of the indifferent patient on total mismatch costs is – all else equal –
larger in the L-segment.
28 The proof, though conceptually straightforward, involves some extremely tedious and detailed algebra and is thus
not reported. However, just to give a brief sketch, it is possible to show that CGRP − CNRP = ϕ1/ϕ2, where ϕ2 > 0 and
ϕ1 is a convex quadratic function of t which crosses zero from below at t = t. Thus, ϕ1 > 0 for t > t. It follows that
CGRP > CTRP = CNRP for t > t.
29 This is not obvious, though, since cGRP1 < c
TRP
1 for p
GRP
1 = pTRP1 . Thus, when comparing GRP and TRP, the equilib-
rium price difference between drug 1 and drug G under GRP is sufficiently large to (more than) compensate for the lower
copayment share, leading to a larger distortion in the L-segment towards drug G.
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The result stated in Proposition 6 is perhaps somewhat surprising. It certainly runs contrary
to the popular concern about the discriminatory effects of therapeutic reference pricing, that this
reimbursement system forces a larger number of patients to opt for a less suitable drug – thereby
increasing mismatch costs – simply to avoid the extra copayment. However, this is not the case
in our model. True, therapeutic reference pricing will increase overall mismatch costs for given
prices, if we use the NRP-case as a benchmark. But this argument ignores the fact that pharma-
ceutical firms will adjust their pricing policies according to the drug reimbursement system. In
our specific model, we have seen that TRP will lead to a proportionally equal reduction in all drug
prices, leaving patients’ drug choices unaffected in equilibrium, compared with NRP. Generic ref-
erence pricing, on the other hand, will lead to more distorted drug choices, due to larger equilibrium
price differences within the therapeutic market. Since the on-patent drug is exempted from refer-
ence pricing under GRP, firm 1 faces a less price-elastic demand than its competitors and can thus
charge a considerably higher price in equilibrium. This, in turn, induces more patients to choose
the drugs that are included in the reference cluster, leading to higher overall mismatch costs.30
5.2. Public payer objectives
The welfare function given by (36) is relevant also for countries with a significant pharmaceuti-
cal industry. However, in countries where the pharmaceutical industry is absent (or insignificant),
it is reasonable to assume that total drug expenditures enter the welfare function directly. Indeed,
a stated desire behind the introduction of reference pricing in many countries is precisely to curb
total outlays on pharmaceuticals. In the following, we will therefore consider a more narrow
public payer objective, where the welfare function is given by consumer surplus net of third-party
payments. We can interpret this as national welfare in countries with no pharmaceutical industry.
In this case, social welfare under reimbursement system k is given by
Wk = ¯U − Ck − πk0 − πk1 − πkG. (39)
With this particular welfare function, maximising welfare amounts to minimising the sum of
mismatch costs and drug expenditures.31 It is straightforward to show that total profits, and thus
total spending on pharmaceuticals, are lowest under TRP and highest under NRP. This follows,
for the most part, directly from the previously derived price and profit rankings.32 Furthermore,
we know from Proposition 6 that TRP always yields equal or lower total mismatch costs in
equilibrium, compared with NRP or GRP. Thus, we reach the following unambiguous conclusion:
Proposition 7. Both mismatch costs and drug expenditures are minimised under TRP.
It follows that social welfare – as defined by (39) – is always higher under TRP.
30 If we include the perceived quality difference between branded and generic drugs in the welfare function, total
mismatch costs will be even higher under GRP (compared with NRP or TRP), since GRP induces more patients to choose
the generic drug.
31 Under the assumption of zero production costs, total drug expenditures (from patients and the public payer) are equal
to total profits.
32 The only possible ambiguity arises in the comparison between NRP and GRP, since both firms 0 and G have lower
prices but higher market shares under GRP. However, this ambiguity is easily resolved by the following argument: Going
from NRP to GRP, expenditures obviously decrease for the segments where patients consume the same drug in the two
regimes, since all prices are lower under GRP. Then there is a segment where H-patients switch from drug 1 to drug 0, and
a segment where L-patients switch from drug 1 to drug G. However, expenditures also decrease for both these segments,
since (by Propositions 3 and 4) pNRP1 > pGRP0 and pNRP1 > pGRPG .
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5.3. Policy implications
In the above analysis, we have considered two polar welfare perspectives, where pharmaceutical
profits are given either full or no weight in the regulator’s objective function. In general, the
relative weighting of mismatch costs and drug expenditures in the welfare function is likely to
depend on the relative importance of the pharmaceutical industry in the country in question. The
more important the pharmaceutical industry is, the less concerned a regulator should be about
pharmaceutical spending. In any case, though, as long as the regulator places any weight on
pharmaceutical spending at all, the above analysis clearly suggests that a therapeutic reference
price system should be implemented, as, compared with the other considered alternatives, this
reimbursement scheme minimises both mismatch costs and pharmaceutical expenditures.
However, this result is reached under the assumption of certain entry of drug 1, and the above
conclusion is only valid if there is indeed an additional, horizontally differentiated drug version
that can be included in the therapeutic cluster. Since equilibrium profits are lowest under TRP
(cf. Proposition 5), this reimbursement system makes market entry least likely, for a given level
of market entry costs. If the possibility of no market entry is taken into account, then the welfare
considerations are no longer clearly in favour of TRP. First, no entry will lead tomaximalmismatch
costs, because only one treatment version (drug 0 and its generic substitute) is offered in the market.
Second, the absence of competition from a horizontally differentiated drug will lead to increased
drug prices – and thus increased pharmaceutical spending – under both NRP and GRP. In this
scenario, the regulator must take into account how the choice of reimbursement system is likely
to affect the probability of market entry for new drugs.
No clear-cut conclusions can be made about the optimal choice of reimbursement system.
However, based on the above analysis, we can make the following classification of scenarios.
Therapeutic reference pricing – which minimises both mismatch costs and drug prices – is clearly
the socially favourable reimbursement system if market entry costs are low, with a corresponding
low risk of no market entry for new drugs. However, if this is not the case, then either NRP or
GRP might be necessary to stimulate market entry. There is then a case for no reference pricing –
which minimises mismatch costs but maximises drug prices – in countries where drug prices do
not play an important role for social welfare, due to a dominant pharmaceutical industry. On the
other hand, generic reference pricing might be the favoured reimbursement system in countries
where the pharmaceutical industry is insignificant or non-existent, since GRP leads to lower drug
prices than NRP.
6. Extension: The case of no coinsurance
Some regulatory systems – like in the Netherlands and the US Medicaid – do not expose
patients to coinsurance. In this section, we therefore consider the special case of α = 0, and check
whether our main results still apply. It is, however, worth noticing that α could be interpreted
as the prescribing physicians’ price consciousness (see, e.g., Hellerstein (1998)). Thus, the case
of α = 0 also implicitly relies on the assumption that the physician is a perfect agent for the
patients only, and therefore do not take the payer’s potential expenditures into account. We retain
all assumptions of our main model, with the exception that α is now set to zero.33
33 As previously argued, introducing a fixed copayment f for drug consumption would not affect the results as long as f
is equal for all drugs. This also applies when α = 0. Thus, for simplicity, we retain our assumption of f = 0.
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Consider first the case of no reference pricing. In this regime, consumers will be insentitive to
price differences when choosing which drug to purchase; only the drugs’ vertical and horizontal
characteristics matter. As a consequence, no consumer demands the generic drug, since this is
perceived to be of lower quality than the two brand-names. The choice between the two brand-
name drugs is solely determined by their horizontal characteristics. Since the two drugs are
symmetrically differentiated, each brand-name receives half of the market, i.e., D0 = D1 = 1/2,
irrespective of their price setting.
The profit functions of the brand-name firms are, thus, π0 = p0/2 and π1 = p1/2. Obviously,
both firms would charge the maximum possible price. Let pˆ denote the maximum price the firms
are able to obtain. This price can be interpreted as a price cap imposed by the payer or the outcome
of negotiations between payers and firms. Alternatively, if the insurance market is competitive,
such that payers have no market power, we can think of pˆ as the price that makes the payers’
budget constraint bind, i.e., the actuarily fair premium. The determination of this maximum price
is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following, we just assume that it exists. Thus, under no
reference pricing, the equilibrium prices are simply
pNPR0 = pNPR1 = pˆ (40)
The generic firm obtains zero demand and profits, and is therefore not active in this equilibrium.
Thus, a copayment system with no coinsurance is harmful for generic competition. The reason is
simply that, under this system, demand is perfectly inelastic to prices.
Consider now the case of therapeutic reference pricing. In Section 3, we saw that the equilib-
rium outcomes under TRP are independent of the coinsurance rate. Consequently, the equilibrium
presented in Section 3 for TRP applies also for the special case of α = 0. As previously shown,
since, with TRP, patients are fully liable for any price increase above the reference price, the
firms respond to TRP by setting prices as if the patients had no insurance coverage (α = 1). This
implies that equilibrium prices are independent of the coinsurance rate.
Finally, consider the case of generic reference pricing. In this case, patients must pay the
price difference p0 − pG if they choose the original brand-name drug 0, but not if they choose
the horizontally differentiated drug 1. The derivation of the equilibrium is similar to the case of
α > 0. Note, however, that there is no effectual horizontal competition under GRP when α = 0,
since firm 1 has no means to attract patients. Thus, the equilibrium strategy for firm 1 is to set the
price as high as possible. The equilibrium prices are given by34:
pGRP0 =
(
1 − √1 − λ
λ
)[
t − vγ(1 − θ)] , (41)
pGRP1 = pˆ, (42)
34 The equilibrium exists if
t ∈
[
2(1 − θ)(1 − √1 − λ)vγ
2(1 − √1 − λ) − λ , t˜
]
,
where
t˜ := min
{
v(2λ − γ(1 − √1 − λ)(1 − θ))
2λ + √1 − λ − 1 , γv(1 + θ), 2v(1 − θ)
}
.
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pGRPG = 2
(
1 − √1 − λ
λ
)
[t − vγ(1 − θ)] − t, (43)
yielding equilibrium market shares
x˜GRPH =
(
1 − √1 − λ
λ
)
x˜GRPL (44)
and
x˜GRPL =
1
2
− vγ(1 − θ)
2t
. (45)
Since (1 − √1 − λ)/λ ∈ ((1/2), 1) for λ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that x˜GRPH < x˜GRPL < (1/2). Thus,
both patient segments are distorted towards drug treatment 1, and the distortion is higher in the
H-segment. This is quite intuitive, since, when comparing drug G and drug 0, the brand-name drug
is perceived to be of higher quality without being more expensive for patients, while, when com-
paring drug 0 and drug 1, patients must pay a surcharge equal to pGRP0 − pGRPG if choosing drug 0.
While equilibrium profits for firm 1 – and thus the profitability of market entry – obviously
depends on the magnitude of pˆ, we notice that equilibrium market shares do not depend on
this price. Consequently, it is – in principle – straightforward to compare aggregate mismatch
costs under the three different reimbursement schemes also for the special case of α = 0. We
immediately realise that NRP now yields minimal mismatch costs, since firm 0 and firm 1 split
the market equally between them. However, this is only because there is no room for generic
competition without coinsurance.35 Thus, the interesting comparison is between GRP and TRP.
A key result in our previous analysis is that GRP yields the highest health risks, measured as total
mismatch costs. Does this still apply in a system without coinsurance (i.e., α = 0)?
From (41)–(45), we can derive equilibrium mismatch costs under GRP with no coinsurance;
these are reported in the appendix. Since x˜GRPH < x˜GRPL < (1/2), we already know that mismatch
costs are never minimised under GRP. Whether GRP or TRP yields the highest health risks with no
coinsurance depends on a comparison of (C.1) and (C.10), given in the appendix. Unfortunately,
it is infeasible to provide an analyical characterisation of this difference. However, numerical
simulations strongly suggest that CGRP|α=0 > CTRP for the valid parameter configurations.36
Thus, total mismatch costs seem to be higher under GRP also for the special case of no coinsurance.
The causes of the larger distortion under GRP are somewhat different from the previous case,
though. When α > 0, GRP yields higher mismatch costs mainly because of increased distortion
towards the generic drug in the L-segment. However, with no coinsurance, GRP creates a relatively
strong distortion – in both patient segments – towards drug 1, as explained above. Under TRP,
on the other hand, there is an extra copayment, in equilibrium, for consumption of drug 1. This
contributes to a more symmetric outcome, compared with GRP, with less distorted drug choices.
7. Discussion and concluding remarks
We have analysed the effects of reference pricing systems for pharmaceuticals, focusing on
a specific therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the firms offer
35 There could be room for generic competition without coinsurance if patients have to pay a fixed fee that is lower for
generic drugs than for brand-name drugs. This possibility is not pursued in the present model.
36 More details are available from the authors upon request.
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horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of these drugs is off-patent and faces com-
petition from a generic version offered by a third firm. The other drug is on-patent and will be
introduced in the market, if the profits are sufficient to cover the entry costs.
This framework has allowed us to compare generic reference pricing and therapeutic reference
pricing, as well as the benchmark-case of no reference pricing. We have shown that TRP triggers
competition most, resulting in lower equilibrium prices for every drug in the therapeutic market.
We have also shown that GRP distorts drug choices most, resulting in a higher level of patient health
risks – measured in terms of aggregate mismatch costs – than the other two reimbursement systems.
Thus, TRP is preferable from the perspective of both the purchaser (payer) and the patients.
Notably, the beneficial role of TRP crucially relies on the assumption that the new on-patent
drug enters the market. If the market entry costs are sufficiently high, TRP may in fact result
in a worse outcome than both GRP and NRP, as described above. It has, however, been argued
that TRP may induce pharmaceutical firms to invest more in drastic innovations, not subject
to reference pricing, rather than non-drastic innovations, which very likely will be included in
a reference group. The trade-off with respect to therapeutically similar innovations is thus the
following: while innovations of therapeutic substitutes increase competition and reduce patients’
mismatch costs by offering a different variant of treatment for the same illness, they might crowd
out drastic innovations if they reduce the budget available for R&D. On the other hand, different
drug versions are often innovated in so-called R&D-races, implying that therapeutically similar
innovations are already in the ‘pipeline’ when the first drastic innovation enters the market. A
thorough analysis of this issue requires an explicit model of drug innovations, which is outside
the scope of the present paper.
There are also several other issues related to reference pricing of pharmaceuticals that, naturally,
have not been subject to a full treatment within our model framework. As previously discussed,
an important and much debated issue is how RP systems affect entry of new drugs. In the present
paper, we have focused on entry of therapeutic substitutes. However, RP systems may also affect
entry incentives for generic substitutes. We can reasonably assume that the probability of generic
entry increases with expected profits for the producer of generic drugs. In our model, it is possible
to show that – similar to firm 1 profits – equilibrium profits of the generic producer (firm G) is
highest under NRP and lowest under TRP. Thus, based on our analysis, it is possible to argue
that RP – in particular TRP – might discourage not only entry of therapeutic substitutes, but also
generic entry.
A related issue is how entry impacts the RP level. It has been argued that entry of new on-patent
drugs may, in fact, raise the RP level. Our model produces the opposite result. Entry of a new
treatment (drug 1) triggers competition, resulting in lower prices and thus a lower reference price
level. One can, however, argue that, if the new drug is of substantially higher quality than the
existing treatment, the producer can charge a higher price, which in turn may result in a higher RP.
This reasoning is correct if we assume existing prices to be given and thus ignore price responses
to the entry of a new treatment. However, entry of a new and better treatment is likely to induce
the incumbent firms to reduce their prices even further (compared with entry of a new but equally
good treatment) in order to avoid losing large market shares. If the RP is set equal to the lowest
price in the cluster, as we assume in the paper, then surely entry, even of a high-quality treatment,
will result in a lower RP level. However, under a more general RP rule, like a weighted average of
all drug prices in a cluster, the impact of entry on the RP level may be indeterminate, with the sign
depending on the weight attached to the new drug treatment relative to the existing treatments.
Another interesting issue is the optimal clustering of drugs in a therapeutic reference pricing
system. Our model – with only three drugs in the therapeutic market – has been constructed
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to analyse the policy choice between generic and therapeutic reference pricing. In other words,
the question of optimal clustering has been narrowed to a question of generic versus therapeutic
reference pricing. However, if there are more than two horizontally differentiated drugs in a
therapeutic market, another related policy question arises: which, and how many, of these drugs
should be included in a therapeutic reference cluster? In other words, what is the optimal breadth
of a therapeutic cluster under TRP? This is a question that cannot be addressed directly in the
present model. However, our analysis can still shed some light on the relevant mechanisms and
trade-offs involved, and give some indications of the likely results.
In our model, the breadth of a therapeutic cluster can be captured by the parameter t. Under
TRP, a lower (higher) value of t implies – all else equal – a narrower (broader) cluster. Obviously,
equilibrium prices, with or without reference pricing, are increasing in t. More substitutability
(a lower t) intensifies competition and leads to lower drug price. However, from (9)–(11) and
(22), it is clear that – compared with NRP – the price effect of TRP is also increasing in t. In
other words, the competitive effect of TRP is larger in markets where there is less competition to
begin with. This suggests that, if the regulator is mainly concerned about reducing drug spending,
the therapeutic clusters should be broadly defined. On the other hand, broader clusters imply
a potentially stronger negative effect on the entry of new drugs. What about the concern for
minimising health risks (mismatch costs)? Our analysis suggests that, as long as all drugs in a
therapeutic market are included, the introduction of TRP does not lead to more distorted drug
choices. However, if some drugs are excluded from the reference cluster, mismatch costs are
likely to increase. This would, in fact, resemble the comparison between GRP and TRP in our
model, where the exclusion of one drug from the reference cluster leads to more asymmetric, and
thus more distorted, drug choices. We can thus speculate that, in order to avoid large distortions
in drug choices under TRP, the reference cluster should either be relatively narrowly defined, in
order to maintain sufficient competition between excluded drugs, or very broadly defined, where
all drugs in the therapeutic market are included. Intuitively, the former alternative will, to a larger
extent, stimulate entry of new drugs, while the dampening effect on drug spending will be more
moderate.
Finally, our modelling of RP is also, naturally, stylised to a point where it is not possible to
capture the full variety of different reimbursement systems that can be observed across different
countries. One important policy option that has not been considered in the present paper is tiered
formularies, where patients are exposed to different copayments according to a drug’s status in
the formulary of the benefit plan. Typically, patients face the highest copayment (or even no
coverage) for drugs not included in the formulary, medium copayment for listed brand-name
drugs, and lowest copayment for listed generic drugs. Tiered formularies are thus close to a
coinsurance system in the sense that it aims at inducing patients to purchase cheaper drugs with
similar therapeutic effects. Now, if a plan with a three-tiered formulary specifies the different
copayments as ci = αpi, i = 0, 1,G, then the NRP regime would in fact be equivalent to a tiered
formulary system. Obviously, the correspondence between drug prices and copayments may not
be so direct. If the different copayments are not very responsive to drug prices, we are, in effect,
back to the case of no coinsurance, with the only difference that relative copayments will shift
market shares.37 In this case, tiered formularies do not affect pricing decisions, they only shift
37 More precisely, the demand structure would be like the following:
˜XH = x˜H − f0 − f12t and
˜XL = x˜L − fG − f12t .
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demand towards drugs with lower copayments, implying that the analysis of a tiered formulary
would not be qualitatively different from the present analysis.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the price equilibrium
In a vertically separating equilibrium, characterised by a price vector (p0, p1, pG), the follow-
ing conditions must hold:
Condition 1: pG ≥ 0.
Condition 2: UL(x,G) ≥ UL(x, 0).
Condition 3: UH(x, 0) ≥ UH(x,G).
Condition 4: UH(x˜H, 0) ≥ 0.
Condition 5: UL(x˜L,G) ≥ 0.
Condition 6: π0(p0, p1, pG) ≥ π0(pˆ0, p1, pG), where pˆ0 solves UL(x,G) = UL(x, 0).
Condition 7: πG(p0, p1, pG) ≥ πG(p0, p1, pˆG), where pˆG solves UH(x, 0) = UH(x,G).
The first condition simply states that the generic price must be non-negative. Conditions 2–3
ensure that the equilibrium really separates, i.e., that H-types choose the brand-name drug 0, while
L-types choose the generic substitute. Conditions 4 and 5 secure full market coverage, requiring
that the indifferent patients obtain non-negative utility from purchasing and consuming either of
the drugs. Finally, Condition 6 (7) ensures that Firm 0 (Firm G) has no incentive to deviate by
reducing its price and serve the L-types (H-types).
In the following, we will derive the price equilibrium in detail for the NRP-case. For the two
other cases – where the derivation of the equilibrium follows an identical procedure – we will just
present the constraints that support the equilibrium.
A.1. No reference pricing
Profit functions are given by (7), with ci = αpi. Let us first confirm that unconstrained pricing
by all three firms cannot constitute an equilibrium. Unconstrained maximisation of the firms’
profit functions yields the following reaction functions:
p0 = 12α (t + αp1), (A.1)
p1 = 12α [t + (1 − λ)(1 − θ)γv + αpG(1 − λ) + αλp0], (A.2)
pG = 12α [t + αp1 − γv(1 − θ)], (A.3)
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which yield the following candidate equilibrium prices:
p0 = 1
α
[
t + 1
6
γv(1 − θ)(1 − λ)
]
, (A.4)
p1 = 1
α
[
t + 1
3
γv(1 − θ)(1 − λ)
]
, (A.5)
pG = 1
α
[
t − 1
6
γv(1 − θ)(2 + λ)
]
. (A.6)
We can show that this price vector always violates Condition 2. In the NRP-case, Condition 2 can
be expressed as
pG ≤ p0 − 1
α
γv(1 − θ). (A.7)
Using (A.4) and (A.6), this condition reduces to 2 ≥ 5, which is a contradiction. In other words,
(A.4)–(A.6) cannot be an equilibrium, because pG is too high to induce even the L-type patients
to buy the generic drug. Consequently, we must look for an equilibrium where the generic drug is
priced sufficiently low, so that not only are the L-types not induced to switch to drug 0, but firm
0 must also have no incentive to capture the L-types by lowering its price from the equilibrium
level.
Using (A.1) and (A.2), we can express the profit of firm 0 as a function of pG:
π0(pG) = λ[3t + (1 − λ)(αpG + (1 − θ)γv)]
2
2αt(4 − λ)2 . (A.8)
Firm 0 can drive the generic competitor out of the market, and capture equal shares of the H- and
L-types, by setting a price
pˆ0 = pG + 1
α
γv(1 − θ), (A.9)
which yields a “deviation” profit given by
πˆ0(pG) = [6t − (2 + λ)(αpG + (1 − θ)γv)](αpG + (1 − θ)γv)2αt(4 − λ) . (A.10)
The optimal strategy for firm G is thus to set a price pG that is just low enough to make such a
deviation unprofitable. This price is given by the solution to
π0(pG) = πˆ0(pG). (A.11)
We can thus derive the price equilibrium by solving the three Eqs. (A.1), (A.2) and (A.11). The
solution is presented as (9)–(11) in Section 3.
It remains to specify Conditions 1–7 for the NRP-case. By construction of the equilibrium,
we know that Condition 6 is automatically satisfied. We can also show that Condition 2 is always
satisfied. In the NRP-case, this condition is given by
θγv − αpNRPG ≥ γv − αpNRP0 , (A.12)
which, using (9) and (11), reduces to
Δ0 − ΔG ≥ 0, (A.13)
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which is true for all λ ∈ (0, 1). The remainder of the constraints can be expressed in the form of
four different conditions on t. From (11), we see that a non-negative generic drug price – Condition
1 – is guaranteed if
t ≥ tNRP1 :=
(1 − θ)γv
3ΔG
. (A.14)
Furthermore, non-negative utility for the indifferent consumers of the H- and L-type, respectively,
is guaranteed if
t ≤ tNRP4 :=
2v
1 + 3Δ0 + Δ1 (A.15)
and
t ≤ tNRP5 :=
2γv
1 + Δ1 + 3ΔG . (A.16)
The necessary Condition 7 is not analytically solvable. However, to simplify, we can find a
sufﬁcient condition on t that satisfies Conditions 3 and 7 simultaneously. By assuming that H-
types always prefer drug 0 over drug G for the equilibrium price pNRP0 and a zero-priced generic
drug (i.e., pG = 0), it must be true that H-types always prefer drug 0 in equilibrium (for a non-
negative generic drug price) and that price-undercutting by the generic firm in order to capture
H-type consumers is not an option. Using pNRP0 from (9), and setting pG = 0, this condition is
given by
t ≤ tNRP7 :=
v(1 − θ)
3Δ0
. (A.17)
To sum up, a price equilibrium exists in the NRP-case, and is given by (9)–(11), when
t ∈ [t, ¯tNRP], where t := tNRP1 and ¯tNRP := min{tNRP4 , tNRP5 , tNRP7 }. In general, existence of the
equilibrium requires that the share of L-types is relatively low, combined with a sufficiently large
difference in gross valuations between the two types. To give an illustrative numerical example,
assume that v = 1, λ = 0.9, θ = 0.8 and γ = 0.4. In this case, t = 0.12 and ¯tNRP = tNRP7 = 0.20.
Note also that the equilibrium exists for an even wider range of mismatch costs, since the upper
bound ¯tNRP in this case is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition.
A.2. Therapeutic reference pricing
The price equilibrium under TRP is derived similarly to the NRP-case, and given by (22) in
Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisfied. Furthermore, Conditions 1 and 2 are
identical under NRP and TRP. The remainder of the Conditions – 4, 5 and 3 + 7 – are given by,
respectively,
t ≤ tTRP4 :=
2(1 − γ(1 − θ)(1 − α))v
1 + 3Δ0 + Δ1 − 6ΔG(1 − α) , (A.18)
t ≤ tTRP5 :=
2(θ + α(1 − θ))γv
1 + Δ1 − 3ΔG(1 − 2α) , (A.19)
t ≤ tTRP7 :=
(1 − γ(1 − α))(1 − θ)v
3(Δ0 − ΔG(1 − α)) . (A.20)
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Thus, under TRP, an equilibrium exists, and is given by (22), when t ∈ [t, ¯tTRP], where
¯tTRP := min{tTRP4 , tTRP5 , tTRP7 }. It is worth noting that, due to lower equilibrium prices, the range
of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is generally wider under TRP. Using the same
numerical example as in the NRP-case, with a 10% copayment rate (α = 0.1), the lower and upper
bounds on t are given by t = 0.12 and ¯tTRP = tTRP7 = 0.34.
A.3. Generic reference pricing
The price equilibrium under GRP is derived similarly to the NRP- and TRP-cases, and given
by (25)–(27) in Section 3. As before, Condition 6 is automatically satisfied.
Using (25)–(27), we can derive the remainder of the conditions that support the equilibrium
under GRP. Once more, it can be shown that Condition 1 is satisfied if t ≥ t, implying that
Condition 1 is identical for all three regimes.
Condition 2 is given by
t ≥ tGRP2 :=
1
3
(1 − α)γ(1 − θ)v. (A.21)
Since tGRP1 ≥ (1 − θ)γv, it follows that t ≥ tGRP2 . Thus, as long as Condition 1 is satisfied, Con-
dition 2 is also automatically satisfied. Conditions 4 and 5 are given by, respectively,
t ≤ tGRP4 :=
2 ˜Δv + (1 − α)(1 − θ)γv(3(2 + α) + κ − 2 ˆΔ)
˜Δ + ¯Δ + 15α − 3λα(4 − α − λ) − 3(1 − λ)(2 − λ) + 3κ , (A.22)
where
κ :=
(√
1 − λ
)
[2 + λ − α(5 − 2λ)], (A.23)
and
t ≤ tGRP5 :=
˜Δ(1 + θ) + (1 − θ)[(1 − α)[2(2 + α) + ς] − ˆΔ(1 − 2α)]
˜Δ + ¯Δ + 3α[4 − λ(3 − α − λ)] + 3ς , (A.24)
where
ς :=
(√
1 − λ
)
(λ(2α + 1) − 6α). (A.25)
Finally, the sufficient condition that simultaneously satisfies Condition 3 and Condition 7 is given
by
t ≤ tGRP7 :=
(1 − θ)( ˜Δv + γv(1 − α)(2 + α + (√1 − λ)(2 − α(3 − λ)) − ˆΔ))
3(5α + λ(1 − α)(3 − α − λ) + (√1 − λ)(2 − α(3 − λ)) − 2) . (A.26)
Thus, under GRP, an equilibrium exists, and is given by (25)–(27), when t ∈ [t, ¯tGRP], where
¯tGRP := min{tGRP4 , tGRP5 , tGRP7 }. Once more, due to the general price reducing effect of reference
pricing, the range of mismatch costs for which the equilibrium exists is generally wider also under
the GRP system, compared with the NRP case. Using the same numerical example as previously,
the lower and upper bounds on t are given by t = 0.12 and ¯tGRP = tGRP7 = 0.29.
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Appendix B. Equilibrium proﬁts under GRP
Equilibrium profits under generic reference pricing are given by
πGRP0 =
(2 + α − (√1 − λ)(2 − λ − α))2Γ 2λ
2t ˜Δ2
, (B.1)
πGRP1 =
(3t − Γ )(Ω − 2√1 − λ(λ − 2α + αλ)Ψ ) + t2(6(√1 − λ)(λ − 2α + αλ) ¯Δ + Φ)
2tα ˜Δ2
,
(B.2)
πGRPG =
Γ
(
α(2 − λ) + λ(3 − λ) + (√1 − λ) (2α + λ)) (1 − λ)Θ
2t ˜Δ2
, (B.3)
where
Ω := 2tω1 + γv(1 − α)(1 − θ)ω2, (B.4)
ω1 := 64αλ + 8α2 + 2λ2 + 9λ3 − 12λ4 + 6λ5 − λ6 − 86αλ2 − 8α2λ + 40αλ3 + 4α3λ
− 6αλ4 + 19α2λ2 − 13α2λ3 − 4α3λ2 + 3α2λ4 + 2α3λ3, (B.5)
ω2 := 16αλ + 8α2 + 26λ2 − 41λ3 + 26λ4 − 8λ5 + λ6 − 30αλ2 − 16α2λ + 28αλ3
− 12αλ4 + 2αλ5 + 13α2λ2 − 5α2λ3 + α2λ4, (B.6)
Ψ := γv(1 − α)(1 − θ)(2α + 5λ − 2αλ − 4λ2 + λ3 + αλ2) + 2t(2α − 7λ + 7λ2 − 2λ3
−αλ2 + α2λ), (B.7)
Φ := 136α2 − 16αλ + 10λ2 − 5λ3 + 2λ4 − 4λ5 + λ6 + 82αλ2 − 192α2λ − 60αλ3
+ 40α3λ + 16αλ4 − 2αλ5 + 105α2λ2 − 13α2λ3 − 24α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 + 4α3λ3
+ 4α4λ2, (B.8)
Θ := 3t(αλ − 3λ + λ2 + 4) − γv(1 − θ) ˆΔ −
(√
1 − λ
)
(4 − λ)Γ. (B.9)
Appendix C. Equilibrium mismatch costs
Inserting the expressions for the locations of indifferent patients in the different reimbursement
regimes – reported throughout Section 3 – into (37), equilibrium mismatch costs are given by
CNRP = CTRP = (δ − 6(
√
1 − λ)(5λ + 4)(1 − λ)3)t
4(3λ − 3λ2 + λ3 + 8)2 , (C.1)
where
δ := 104 + 6λ − 78λ2 + 53λ3 − 15λ4 + 15λ5 − 4λ6, (C.2)
K.R. Brekke et al. / Journal of Health Economics 26 (2007) 613–642 639
and
CGRP = (3t − Γ )[(3t − Γ )(2
√
1 − λΥ − Λ) + 2t(√1 − λμ − η)] + t2(+ 6ξ√1 − λ)
4t ˜Δ2
,
(C.3)
where
ξ := 16αλ − 12λ − 4α2 + 23λ2 − 17λ3 + 4λ4 − 18αλ2 + 5α2λ + 4αλ3 − 2α3λ + αλ4
− 3α2λ2 + 2α2λ3 + α3λ2, (C.4)
 := 72λ + 64αλ + 104α2 − 94λ2 + 74λ3 − 53λ4 + 25λ5 − 4λ6 − 150α2λ − 30αλ3
+ 20α3λ + 44αλ4 − 10αλ5 + 66α2λ2 + 7α2λ3 − 12α3λ2 − 6α2λ4
+ 2α3λ3 + 2α4λ2 − 40αλ2, (C.5)
Λ := 12λ3 − 16αλ − 8α2 − 2λ2 − 8λ − 7λ4 + λ5 + 24αλ2 + 14α2λ − 14αλ3 + 2αλ4
− 8α2λ2 + α2λ3, (C.6)
Υ := 8αλ − 4λ + 4α2 + 5λ2 − 4λ3 + λ4 − 10αλ2 − 5α2λ + 3αλ3 + 2α2λ2, (C.7)
μ := 24λ − 40αλ − 8α2 − 38λ2 + 29λ3 − 7λ4 + 48αλ2 + 10α2λ − 13αλ3 + 2α3λ
−αλ4 − 3α2λ2 − 2α2λ3 − α3λ2, (C.8)
η := 24λ − 8αλ + 8α2 − 34λ2 + 21λ3 − 12λ4 + 6λ5 − λ6 + 16αλ2 − 14α2λ − 20αλ3
− 2α3λ + 15αλ4 − 3αλ5 − 5α2λ2 + 11α2λ3 + 2α3λ2 − 3α2λ4 − α3λ3. (C.9)
C.1. GRP with no coinsurance
Using (41)–(45), equilibrium mismatch costs under GRP for the special case of α = 0 are
given by
CGRP|α=0 =
γv(1 − θ) (γv(1 − θ) (2 (1 − √1 − λ)− λ2)+ 2t ˆλ)+ t2 ˜λ
4tλ
, (C.10)
where
ˆλ := √1 − λ(2 − λ) − 2(1 − λ) (C.11)
and
˜λ := 2 − λ(2 − λ) − 2√1 − λ(1 − λ). (C.12)
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Appendix D. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the price difference between the two brand-name drugs
are given by
pGRP1 − pGRP0 =
γv(1 − α)(1 − θ)[ ˆΔ − 4 + α2 − (√1 − λ)(λ − α2)] + tσ
α ˜Δ
, (D.1)
where
σ := 4α + λ − 6αλ − 3α2 + 2λ2 − λ3 + αλ2 + 2α2λ + 3(√1 − λ)(λ − α2). (D.2)
By the definition of ˆΔ, it can easily be verified that the sum of the four terms in the square brackets
in the numerator in (D.1) is positive for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). The sign of the expression
depends thus on the sign of σ. Once more, it is relatively straightforward to verify that σ > 0 for
all λ ∈ (0, 1) if α < (2/3). Thus, α < (2/3) is a sufﬁcient condition for pGRP1 > pGRP0 .
Regarding equilibrium market allocations, we derive from (33) that
x˜GRPL >
1
2
if t > γv(1 − θ)β, (D.3)
where
β := (1 − α) (
√
1 − λ)(2α + λ) + 2α + λ(3 − λ − α)
3(√1 − λ)(2α + λ) − 2α + λ + 3αλ + 2λ2 − λ3 − 2αλ2 − α2λ. (D.4)
It is fairly straightforward to verify that β < 1 for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that
t > γv(1 − θ)β (and thus x˜GRPL > (1/2)) as long as Condition 1 (non-negative generic price) is
satisfied.
Now consider the indifferent type-H patient. From (32), we can characterise x˜GRPH as a function
of t in the following way:
∂x˜GRPH
∂t
> 0 for t = 0, (D.5)
lim
t→0+
(x˜GRPH ) → −∞, (D.6)
and
lim
t→−∞(x˜
GRP
H ) = limt→∞(x˜
GRP
H ) = ϑ, (D.7)
where
ϑ := 3(2 + α − (
√
1 − λ)(2 − λ − α))
2 ˜Δ
. (D.8)
It follows that x˜GRPH < (1/2) for t > 0 if ϑ < (1/2) for α ∈ (0, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand,
if ϑ > (1/2) for some combinations of λ and α, it must be that x˜GRPH > (1/2) if t is sufficiently
high. Solving ϑ = (1/2) for α yields a function α∗(λ), such that ϑ < (>)(1/2) if α < (>)α∗(λ).
It is straightforward to verify that ∂α∗/∂λ > 0 and that α∗ < 0 for λ < 0.54. It follows that
x˜GRPH < (1/2) if λ < 0.54, whereas, for λ > 0.54, x˜GRPH > (1/2) if λ and/or t are sufficiently high.
By numerical simulations, it is also straightforward to verify that both cases, x˜GRPH < (1/2) and
x˜GRPH > (1/2), can occur in equilibrium. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. A direct analytical comparison of equilibrium profits for firm 1 under
the three different regimes is infeasible, since the equilibrium profit expression under GRP is
extremely detailed. However, we can prove the proposition via a somewhat more subtle route, by
considering how different reimbursement systems affect equilibrium prices and market shares.
From Proposition 3, we know that there is a clear-cut ranking of equilibrium prices across
the different regimes, where pNRPi > pGRPi > pTRPi , i = 0, 1,G. Regarding equilibrium mar-
ket shares, we know that these are identical under NRP and TRP. Furthermore, we also know
that x˜GRPj > x˜TRPj = x˜NRPj , j = H,L. Thus, since pNRP1 > pGRP1 > pTRP1 and demand is at least
as high under NRP than under any other reimbursement regime, it follows unambiguously that
πNRP1 > max{πGRP1 , πTRP1 }. Regarding the comparison between GRP and TRP, it is not immedi-
ately obvious that firm 1 earns higher profits under GRP, since prices are higher, but market shares
are lower, compared with TRP. Note, however, that equilibrium prices are higher for allfirms under
GRP, compared with TRP. Furthermore, we know that, for given prices, cGRP1 < cTRP1 . Thus, if
firm 1 unilaterally deviates from the GRP equilibrium by setting a price equal to the equilibrium
price under TRP, this firm will increase its market shares, in both consumer segments, beyond
its equilibrium market shares under TRP, and consequently earn higher profits than under TRP.
Such a deviation is not profitable, so firm 1 must earn even higher profits in the GRP equilibrium,
where pGRP1 > pTRP1 . 
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